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CHAPTER IV.

THE same ill fortune which attended the British arms in the
Mediterranean pursued their military operations in the western
hemisphere, and a singular resemblance is discernible between
the circumstances by which the failure was accompanied in both
cases. Though the expedition to La Plata was undertaken
without the knowledge of the government, the success which at
first attended it was allowed to justify the commander, and the
national exultation was enhanced by the novelty of the conquest.
The loss of Buenos Ayres gave a sudden damp to the public
joy, and involved the total disappointment of many of the great
and expensive schemes undertaken by the British merchants,
under the persuasion that the conquest would be permanent.
Thus, not to have succeeded in the enterprize against the capi-
tal would have been an infinitely less evil than a short-lived suc-
cess, and this not only from the slaughter and captivity of so
many valuable troops, but from the ruin and waste of the mer-
chandize shipped to South America, occasioned by the re-con-
quest.

Though the English commanders were dislodged from Bue-
nos Ayres, they did not abandon the scene in despair, but, as
we have seen, after being reinforced by fresh troops from the
Cape of Good Hope, made a successful attack on Monte Video.
The hostile temper of their new subjects prevented them, for
some time, from attempting to regain their lost footing; nor
was it till the arrival of a considerable force under general
Crawford, about the middle of June, and five months after their
conquest of Monte Video, that they began to look abroad.

The Spanish empire in America is little more than a world
of forests and morasses, and though there exist provincial allot-
ments and distinctions on paper, they are seldom exemplified
in practice. Wherever convenience has placed a settlement,
this becomes the centre of government and trade to all the coun-
try round it, and this country is called a province, though ninety-
nine parts in a hundred are unoccupied by Spaniards, and are
even unknown to them. The river La Plata is the great inlet
into that part of the eastern coast of South America claimed by
Spain. On this, therefore, the principal or only settlements
are made, and these being acquired by an enemy, the enemy

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succeeds to the pre-eminence enjoyed by Spain over all the wild
regions stretching a thousand or more miles in all directions
from these. Buenos Ayres and Monte Video are the chief of
these settlements, and the empire devolves necessarily on the
possessors of these. The former was now to be gained, and
the acquisition could not reasonably be expected to cost much
time or trouble.

All the troops and ships that could be spared proceeded, on
the 25th of June, from Monte Video towards the capital, under
the command of general Whitlocke. Three days after, the
army was disembarked about thirty miles from the city. The
intermediate ground was little more than a swamp, intersected
by deep rivulets, among which it was impossible to procure
guides deserving of full confidence. A few miles from the city
ran a considerable river, over which was a bridge, and the
opposite bank of which was well fortified and garrisoned. To
avoid this opposition it was necessary to attempt the passage
of the river above the bridge; and there being a spot where the
stream was fordable, part of the English army directed their
steps thither, while another part sought a passage at a place
called Chico. One of the columns encountered and dispersed
a body of Spanish troops, and next day the army re-united in
the suburbs of the city.

The situation of Buenos Ayres was very singular. It was
a large city, situated on a level, without ramparts or walls, with
few regular or disciplined troops, and surrounded by a nume-
rous army not unprovided with artillery. What opposition
could possibly be made in such helpless and desperate circum-
stances? The enemy could overpower resistance by battering
the town with cannon, or more expeditiously overrun its squares
and avenues; and yet, strange as it may seem, this city prepared
to make an obstinate resistance, and this resistance was finally
successful.

The solution of this difficulty must be sought in the manner
in which the city was built. It is divided pretty equally into
squares of four or five hundred feet, the sides of which are
built up in a solid manner with houses having flat roofs. The
buildings, we are obliged to infer, consist of brick or stone;
otherwise, by being set on fire, their inhabitants might have
been easily dislodged. In the centre is an open space, with a
rude fortress, dignified with the name of citadel. The houses
are contiguous, and have flat roofs, and thus the city may be
considered as an assemblage of ramparts and dry ditches. The
avenues were rendered difficult of access by ditches dug across
them, and by cannon judiciously placed.

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These advantages, however, would have availed nothing, had
not the people been animated by an incredible animosity against
the strangers. The master of each house, surrounded with his
children and slaves, was posted on its roof, and amply supplied
with arms and ammunition. The doors were strongly barri-
cadoed, and the warlike spirit so strong, that the whole male,
and much of the female population of the city was engaged in
its defence. Modern history scarcely affords another example
of such zealous and unanimous efforts in the inhabitants of a
besieged town.

The invaders, being aware of the preparations made to re-
ceive them, determined nevertheless to enter rather than besiege
the city. This decision was probably dictated by their being
unable either to blockade the city, and thus reduce it by famine,
or to keep up a regular attack by batteries. The difficulty of
obtaining supplies for themselves may account for the former;
a difficulty owing to the inveterate enmity of the colonists, and
the means industriously employed for driving off all the cattle
in the neighbourhood. The latter cannot be so easily explain-
ed, except so far as it is explained by the cause just mentioned.
Resolving to enter without delay, some of the troops were di-
rected to get possession of the houses and roofs, this being the
only means of success, while the movements of the rest were
regulated by a just consideration of the direction and position
of the streets and squares.

The attack commenced on the fifth of July. The assailants
were divided into separate bands*, each having its peculiar
avenue to enter, and its course of action prescribed. All of
them had their muskets uncharged, it being thought a useless
waste of ammunition to fire, except with cannon, before their
appointed stations were gained.

There were two strong posts in the city, where the Spaniards
had intrenched themselves, and these were attacked and taken
by sir Samuel Achmuty; but, after a long and destructive con-
test of ten hours, these posts only remained in possession of the
English. All the other columns were destroyed or overpow-
ered by the fire from the roofs and windows. At every step
the assailants encountered every species of missile destruction:
grape-shot from the corner of every street; musketry, hand-
grenades, bricks, and stones from the windows and house-tops.
Every dwelling was a fortress, and all its tenants daring and
indefatigable in its defence. Some of the detachments were
* We have minute accounts of this transaction both from British and Spa-
nish witnesses; but, without a plan or topographical description of the city,
they cannot be made intelligible.

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totally destroyed; others compelled, after great slaughter, to
surrender in the streets. Others sheltered themselves in con-
vents and churches, and, after a dreadful havoc on both sides,
yielded to overwhelming numbers. Finally, the two posts al-
ready mentioned remained in possession of the English, but all
the other efforts had failed, with the loss of twenty-five hundred
men slain, wounded, and prisoners. The ensuing night was
passed by each party in preparing for a new contest on the mor-
row; but the next morning the Spanish commander, Liniers,
offered to restore his prisoners, provided the British commander
would stipulate to withdraw, not only from the city, but from
the river and province. This extraordinary demand was, with
little hesitation, complied with. The only reasons assigned by
the British commander were the danger of a general massacre,
to which the prisoners were exposed, from the fury of the popu-
lace, and the unprofitable nature of the conquest, by reason of the
irreconcileable antipathy of the people. As the first reason could
have no weight with men under the influence of ordinary mili-
tary maxims, and the second implied an authority to judge of
what was beneficial or otherwise, not vested in this officer, we
are obliged to conclude that the English were unable to make
effectual opposition against the threatened attack, their numbers
being so much diminished by the events of the preceding day,
and that this portion of the army being destroyed, the remainder
was insufficient to maintain their former conquests. How far
this decision was prudent or rash, cowardly or brave, is at pre-
sent merely matter of conjecture. A legal review will probably
be had of these transactions, and then we shall be able to form
a more enlightened judgment concerning them.

By the terms of this comprehensive treaty the British agree
to withdraw from Buenos Ayres in ten days, and from South
America in two months, leaving at Monte Video the artillery
and stores, unconsumed, which were found there. A mutual
restitution is promised of all prisoners taken since the arrival
of the English; and thus, in an equal manner, and with as entire
a restoration of things to the state in which they were before
the invasion as was possible, ended, after a year's duration, the
war in South America.

The issue of this contest inculcates some important lessons.
It overthrows two material errors: first, as to the disaffection
of the Spanish colonists to the parent state, arising from com-
mercial restraints; and, secondly, as to the indolence, cowar-
dice, and effeminacy of their character. The habit of imputing
our own feelings to others has betrayed us into the glaring folly
of imagining the same impatience of foreign controul in all the

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American colonies which once actuated ourselves. We have
even harboured the gross delusion, that a wretched adventurer,
at the head of two or three hundred men, picked up in our
cities, could work a revolution in South America, and that the
initial spark only was wanting to kindle a rebellion in Peru or
Mexico. The grossness of these delusions is now made evi-
dent by the failure of so many formidable expeditions to La
Plata.

Whether the establishment of the British power in this quar-
ter would have proved a benefit or evil of the nation, is a point
of much controversy. One advantage is apparent, in its ten-
dency to secure a more favourable peace with France. The
more that England conquers, the more she will have to give at
a peace, in exchange for equivalent concessions. Considered
as permanent possessions, it is very difficult to estimate the im-
mediate value of these districts. We are ignorant of their popu-
lation and riches; of the taxes which the people are able to pay
their governors; of the consumption which British manufac-
tures would meet with; of the military force which the temper
of the people would require to be stationed among them.---
These are necessary grounds of all rational computations of this
kind, and, as they are points wholly unknown, all speculations
on this subject are but dreams.

It should seem, however, sufficiently clear, that never to have
undertaken this enterprize would have been much better than
the failure: many valuable troops and some military reputation
would have been saved, and a great commercial capital would
have been unimpaired: and yet, if this disappointment pre-
clude a future one, by inculcating a proper caution and distrust
with respect to similar projects, it may be an ultimate advantage
to the British nation.

Had the British nation obtained a firm footing in this part of
South America, and their possession been sanctioned by treaty,
we cannot easily assign limits to the emigration which would
have immediately taken place from the British islands, and even
from the states of North America. Husbandmen, artificers, and
merchants would have flocked thither. Their coming would have
been assiduously invited and encouraged by the new govern-
ment, because the safety of the conquest would, by such means,
have been in an eminent degree promoted, and the expence
attending it diminished. The proportion between Spanish and
English would daily vary in favour of the latter, and, in long
process of time, the country would assume an aspect purely
English, the primitive colony being gradually mingled and lost
in the subsequent one, in the same manner as the English have

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overpowered the Dutch in New York. The danger arising
from such a neighbour to the remaining provinces of Spain
may be easily imagined. Their vicinity would breed perpetual
dissentions between the ancient and recent possessors, and these
dissentions could hardly fail of terminating sooner or later in
the subversion of the Spanish power in these regions. Great
Britain would have the honour of bestowing language, manners,
and people on South as well as North America, and two-fifths
of the habitable globe would be occupied by one nation: a won-
derful, yet probable, indeed an inevitable consequence of that
train of events which led the English to La Plata, had their
expedition been successful.