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CHAPTER IX.

THE richest, most fruitful, and best peopled part of the Da-
nish territory is the island of Zealand. It contains the metro-
polis of the kingdom, which is likewise the depository of the
shipping, and of the naval and military stores belonging to the
state. The northern coast of this island forms one side of the
celebrated strait called the Sound. At one point in this chan-
nel, the passage, on account of capricious winds and opposite
currents, very frequent in this quarter, is made with most safe-
ty close along a promontory on the Danish shore. The Danes,
eager to profit by this circumstance, have strongly fortified this
point, and compel every passing vessel to lower its top-sails
and pay a toll. With the usual inconsistency of mankind, who
never see the truth clearly but when it coincides with their own
interest, and who never rail at others more vehemently than
when they share the guilt, the Danes thus levy tribute on the
commerce of the Baltic, though all the great nations of Europe
carry on this commerce, and though their claim has no other con-
ceivable foundation than their power to enforce it, while, at the
same time, they zealously confederate with others to abrogate
a claim of Great Britain, equally iniquitous, though less vexa-
tious and humiliating, and built on the same grounds of irresis-
tible power. This, like all other usurpations, is offensive only
while new, and is now generally submitted to, because it has
time and usage in its favour.

Copenhagen is situated about twenty miles within the sound,
on a circular harbour. The entrance of the port is wide, but the
only navigable channel is narrow*. The approach is defended
by numerous floating batteries, and by some strong castles, and
these defences have been so much strengthened and multiplied
since the attack under Nelson, that the British placed their
hopes of success, on this occasion, only on a formal siege by land.

  * The water on each side is very shallow, and defended by a peculiar kind of
military work called naval horns. They are made of large beams, from sixteen
to thirty feet long, shod with iron, and put together crosswise. They are then
put on flat-bottomed vessels, and sunk three, four, and five feet below the sur-
face of the water. In the belts and other passages, particularly in the narrow
channels, where the water has neither tide nor current, they are easily laid down
and taken up. The Swedes were the first who made use of these works, and
they were afterwards adopted both at Cronstadt and Copenhagen. They were
used for the defence of the Delaware in the American war.

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This mysterious expedition assembled in the Sound, within
a few miles of Copenhagen, on the 12th day of August; and now
being within reach of their prey, its purpose was disclosed. The
Danes, who beheld its approach with indifference, in the belief
that it concerned not them, or with satisfaction, as contributing
by its presence in the Baltic to check the insolence of the
French, were overwhelmed with astonishment and indignation
at finding that an attack was intended upon them. The British
minister, Mr. Taylor, proposed to the Danish government that
all the Danish ships of the line should be deposited in an Eng-
lish port, and a solemn promise was given, that they should be
restored at a general peace, in the same condition as when re-
ceived.

It forms no apology for any crime that the offender had it in
his power to commit a greater one. It is proper, however, to
observe, that the offence of the British government was strictly
limited to this demand, and to the means necessary to enforce
compliance. Aware of the difficulties in their way, they evi-
dently intended, by the greatness of their force, not only to over-
come, but to prevent all opposition, and to furnish the Danes
with motives for a peaceable compliance. The British force
was sufficient to compel the unconditional surrender of all kinds
of property, and to garrison the city and island.

It is not easy to comprehend the motives which induced the
Danish government to refuse compliance with this demand.
They could not doubt the resolution of the enemy to compel
submission, by the capture of the city. If possession were gain-
ed by a formal siege, the city could not escape destruction from
the bullets and bombs of the besiegers. Submission, sooner or
later, was inevitable, but the sooner it took place the less would
be the evil. The enmity of France could not be reasonably
awakened by a conduct dictated by necessity; but if compliance
should draw on a war with France, the British offered to exert
their whole force in defence of their territory against invaders.
Notwithstanding the hopelessness of all resistance, the Danes
refused to give up their ships, and prepared, with remarkable
zeal and unanimity, to repel the assailants.

The English landed their army, without any opposition, on
the 16th of August, at Wisbeck, ten miles north of Copenha-
gen. Next day, they marched to the town and completely in-
vested it, while the frigates and other vessels took their station
at the mouth of the harbour, near enough to throw shells into
the town.

The modern system of besieging aims at taking cities by the
destruction of the houses and slaughter of the people, rather

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than by direct assaults on the walls. These means succeed not
where the garrison is indifferent to the welfare of the people; but
the approaches of the enmy in this case had been so rapid, and
their fleet guarded the whole island with so much vigilance, that
few regular troops contributed to the defence of the city. The
enthusiasm of the people held out for several days after the des-
tructive effects of a bombardment had been experienced. About
the beginning of September, the besiegers had established their
batteries, and, a summons to surrender proving ineffectual, a
great number of shells were thrown from the batteries and ships
during three nights. A great number of private dwellings were
destroyed. The principal church, the university, with its valu-
able libraries and apparatus, were involved in destruction, and
it was not till after great and irreparable havock was made, that
the citizens, and general Peyman, who commanded in the town,
perceived the necessity of surrendering the place. It is mourn-
ful to reflect how many calamities arose from this rash and des-
perate resistance. Timely compliance would have left the city
undiminished and unimpaired, and would have made the evil,
much lighter to the public. Having gained their end by force,
the British made absolute prize of all the ships, great and small,
though their original demand was limited only to ships of the
line, and seized and carried to England all the naval stores and
ammunition, of which the short-sighted policy of Denmark had
accumulated an immense provision.

The prince of Denmark, who governs the kingdom in place
of his father, who is yet alive, but insane, withdrew from his
capital at the approach of the enemy. A violence, so little fore-
seen or merited, from a power hitherto friendly, filled his bosom
with the strongest indignation. He immediately declared war
against Great Britain, and formed a close alliance with France.
All those measures of negative hostility, in the interdiction of
commerce, the imprisonment of Englishmen, and the confisca-
tion of their property, which evince an implacable resentment,
were immediately adopted. No concession or submission was
to be made but to mere force. The city was to hold out even
aganst famine, and, when taken by assault, the foe was to be
cheated of his prey, by the voluntary conflagration of his ships
and arsenals. His people, for a time, fully seconded this zeal;
but the generals at Copenhagen appear to have been unapprized
of his intention with regard to the ships and magazines. All
these were delivered up without injury.

It now appeared that the British government limited their
views merely to the ships and naval stores of Denmark. The
conjectures of the world at large respecting their future pro-

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ceedings proved as erroneous as those respecting the object of
the expedition. Nobody imagined that this armament was de-
signed against Denmark; but, when time disclosed the object,
every one supposed that the fleet and army would remain, and
attempt to maintain its footing in the island. All these conjec-
tures were beside the truth. As soon as the besiegers were
admitted, they began to prepare the Danish fleet for the voyage
to England. They even forbore to enter the city, or to use any
of those privileges which belong to the victors in a captured
town. No quarters or contributions were demanded from the
citizens, and the people of the country were not only left in
quiet possession of their houses and fields, but all provisions
were paid for at a good price. Though the Danish government
were continually thundering against the invaders menaces of
eternal vengeance, and denouncing death and confiscation
against all that bore the name of English, the proscribed army
were calmly pursuing the war against the ships and arsenals
with as little detriment as possible to the people. In the course
of six weeks, sixteen sail of the line, nine frigates, fourteen
sloops of war and smaller vessels, besides gun-boats, were fitted
for sea, and all the large ships laden with masts, spars, timber,
and other stores from the arsenal, from whence also ninety-two
cargoes were shipped on board transports and other vessles
chartered for the purpose, the sum of whose burthen exceeded
twenty thousand tons. Such was the emulation among the
several ships of the fleet to which the Danish ships were respec-
tively attached for equipment, that within nine days fourteen
sail of the line were brought out of the harbour, though several
of them underwent considerable repairs. Of three ships on the
stocks two were taken to pieces, and the useful part of their
timbers brought away; and the third, being in a considerable
state of forwardness, was sawed in various parts, and suffered
to fall over.

All these valuable spoils were declared, in consequence of the
hostile proceedings of the Danes, to be not merely a temporary
pledge or deposit, but the absolute property of the victors.
Thus, in the course of so short a term as three months, a very
large addition was made to the British navy, and an enormous
addition to their naval stores. The acquired ships were lodged
in the British docks, without having incurred the smallest da-
mage, by storms or battles. The ships were for the most part
new and unworn. The contents of the arsenal must have been
of value beyond computation. With regard to the immediate
gain, therefore, no naval effort of the nation was ever crowned
with such splendid success. The indirect advantage, in depriv-

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ing France of the most valued fruit of her late victories, in the
effectual co-operation of Denmark, was no less evident and
memorable. With regard to ultimate and collateral conse-
quences, these can only be fully unfolded by time. An open
war with Denmark and Russia has followed, but it cannot be
proved that these events would not have taken place, nearly at
the same time, had this expedition never have sailed. On the
contrary, it is highly probable that the influence of France
would have led to these events.

It is natural for the French government, in order to brand this
expedition with folly as well as injustice, to deny any design of
compelling Denmark to abandon her neutrality, and, to make this
averment credible, it was easy for political advocates to main-
tain that the emperor of the French was incapable of this act,
because it was unjust; that his interest alone was sufficient to
deter him from it, since his menaces would only have driven
Denmark into an alliance with England; that the French army
might indeed have conquered Holstein, but could not have pass-
ed into the islands, when guarded by the Danish and British
fleets, and that this attack would only have exasperated the Rus-
sians, and renewed the war with that power*. The fallacy of
these pleas is extremely obvious. As to the injustice of driving
Denmark into war with England, all that the interest of France
required was that the Danes should refuse to trade with Great
Britain. This would be considered by the latter as war, and a
regular war on the part of Denmark would be the third una-
voidable step in the course of events. But to trade with Great
Britain is to benefit that power, and is, therefore, in the politi-
cal code of France, hostility against herself. Denmark had
sufficient provocations, of old standing, to excite her to a war,
at least a commercial war, with England, and should she con-
tinue deaf to the dictates of a just revenge and her true interest,
the French emperor would have thought it peculiarly worthy
of his justice to send twenty thousand musketeers to bring
her to reason. Jutland, as well as Holstein, is accessible to an
invading army at all seasons, and the winter's frost frequently
makes the channels between the islands and the main better
roads for men and horses than the land. A French army,
therefore, would either compel the Danes to quarrel with Bri-
tain, or give them courage to do so, should they be so inclined
of themselves. The enmity of France was to be dreaded by

  * These are the topics of a publication in the Moniteur, with reason as-
cribed to the emperor himself, and must therefore be considered as the best
that could be employed for the purpose.

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Russia, and not that of Russia by France; but as the Danish
court could be impelled by menaces as well as violence, the end
could be completed without incurring the resentment of Alex-
ander. Still more fallacious are those pleas, if measures were
taken, at the conferences of Tilsit, for reviving the northern
confederacy against the maritime power of Britain: a scheme
from which they could evidently be deterred only by the fear
of that power. It is plain, indeed, that Great Britain and
France have no guide in their political conduct but their inte-
rest. They were both extremely willing to incur the odium
for the sake of the advantage of attacking Denmark*, and, for-
tunately for Britain, her situation enabled her to anticipate her
adversary on the present occasion.

The English government could not want pleas to justify or
palliate their recent conduct. In a declaration published by
them on this occasion, they not only allege the probability that
France would employ her power to compel Denmark to enlist
in her cause, but they solemnly aver that proofs of such a de-
sign being already formed was in their possession, and, as Den-
mark was wholly unable to resist an attack, they plead an evi-
dent necessity for snatching from their enemy that navy which
would be immediately employed against themselves.

With regard to Denmark, it is easy to conceive the indigna-
tion with which this hostile inroad could not fail to inspire that
people. Every plea made use of by the British, could only
aggravate the injury, and heighten the injustice of their conduct,
in the eyes of the Danes. To be invaded and exterminated by
those, who acknowledge that we have always treated them with
equity; who plead no cause of offence given them by us, but
merely allege, that, innocent and blameless though we be, yet
our destruction contributes remotely to their safety or aggran-
dizement; that, in thus destroying us, they “act solely on the
sense of what was due to the security of their own dominions,”
danger to which they dread not from us but from another, is a
conduct unavoidably followed by our deepest abhorrence and
revenge. It does not moderate these feelings to be told by the
injurer that a similar attack was meditated against us by ano-
ther, and that he seized the spoil merely to prevent one whom

  * No nation has ever scrupled to obtain allies by menaces or bribes. The
history of Europe is a continued tissue of such transactions, but the iniquity,
abstractly considered, is equally evident in both cases. Wherever British
money or ships had access, they have in all ages been liberally employed to in-
crease their own ranks against the enemy. The same conduct has been as di-
ligently employed by France.

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he hates from seizing it before him. The interests of these ri-
vals are nothing to me. I regard them both with equal affec-
tion or indifference, and perform my duty by maintaining peace
with both of them. That they both are willing to destroy me
for their separate advantage, only justifies my fear and hatred of
both; but he that first resorts to actual violence against me will,
of course, incur my first and deepest detestation.

It is thus that the actual parties in any political transaction
will necessarily approve or condemn as the event has relation to
their own interest. One state cannot expect that another will
assent to the justice of conduct adopted with a view to its own
safety or prosperity, when it impairs the safety or prosperity of
that other, because both have the same passion, and an equal
right to gratify it. As long as their interests clash, and one
cannot gain without loss to the other, and both are impelled by
a sort of natural necessity to gain as much as possible, their in-
tercourse can only teem with all the dark and malignant pas-
sions: fear, hatred, and revenge. Invectives and criminations
must multiply between them, and, both being governed by the
same motives, they must alternately perform the same actions,
and expose themselves to the same censure.

An impartial decision in national disputes is scarcely to be
expected, even from distant observers. As every one in his
turn merits censure, and as forbearance, in states, is always mat-
ter not of virtue but necessity, formal judgments on these oc-
casions, limited to particular transactions, are always liable to
error; since they suggest an inference in favour of the habitual
equity of one state, or of the habitual injustice of another, when,
in reality, a comprehensive view would detect as many crimes
in the conduct of one as of the other, and in all cases, if their si-
tuation were changed, they would act alike. So far as mere jus-
tice is considered, the imagination of every party confounds its
decisions with the dictates of his own interest, and every indi-
vidual is prone to consider the welfare of his own nation as
worthy of his sole regard. To promote this welfare becomes a
sacred duty, though at the expence of other nations. Whether
the English were justified in proposing to the Danes the alterna-
tive of giving up their navy to threats, or surrendering it to
force, is a point on which no historical decision will ever have a
practical or coercive influence. All those who are injured by it
will cordially unite in condemning it; all those who care not for
the welfare of Great Britain will refuse their sanction to a deed
which aims at promoting that welfare by injuring another.
The English themselves will demand no other vindication than

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its benefits*, and, in the public councils of the nation, the utmost
rancour of faction will suggest nothing against the patrons of
the expedition but its inutility. It will merely affirm that Den-
mark would not have confederated with France, though this at-
tack had not been made, or that the capture of the Danish fleet
will ultimately prove more hurtful than useful to the British in-
terests, and whether their assertions be true can never be fully
ascertained. Time, indeed, may unveil many distant and
hitherto unthought-of consequences of this event, but what
would have been the future relations between France and Den-
mark, had the latter continued unmolested by Great Britain,
can never be other than a topic of lawless conjecture. The
English profess to have been guided, in the choice of their ex-
pedients, only by a calculation of probabilities. They argued,
not on the treachery, but on the imbecility of Denmark; not on
concessions or compacts already secretly extorted from her
fears by France, but on such as would hereafter be probably
extorted. The Prussian Frederick, in a former age, broke in
upon Saxony, in a time of peace and security, and treated the
astonished and unsuspecting Saxons with all the fury of an ene-
my; and this conduct was thought to be justified, when the in-
vader, ransacking the archives of Dresden, found and published
a treaty that had been secretly concluded between the Saxon and
Austrian princes, with intentions hostile to Prussia. Unhap-
pily for the British government, they could not plead the exist-
ence of any such hostile compact, and were not permitted by
the actual circumstances to form or avow even a suspicion that
such a compact existed. On the contrary, all appearances de-
noted that Denmark and France were hastening to a state of
war, and that concessions injurious to Britain would only be
chosen as the less evil, when the nation should be driven to ex-
tremities from which they were, at present, at a considerable
distance.

It was well known, likewise, that Holstein and Jutland, and
the Baltic isles, did not compose the whole of the Danish do-
minions. These were within reach of an invader from the
south; butwhen these were overrun, the Danish court was not

  * The British government, in their manifestoes, are more honest in displaying
the true motives of their conduct than other states. They occasionally, indeed,
appeal to justice, but always vaguely and faintly, and lay stress on nothing but
“the honour of their crown and the interests of their people.” In their public
declarations, on this occasion, they talk about justice and necessity; but the king
is made expressly to define these terms, by averring the justice and necessity, in
a sovereign, of regarding, in the first place and above all things, “the security of
his people.”

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destitute of a place of refuge and of territory. Norway was
still inaccessible to any but a naval power, and the fleet, instead
of falling a prey to the French, might have been effectually em-
ployed in checking their further progress. The co-operation
of Great Britain would have still further contributed to this
end, and a closer and more cordial alliance than ever have con-
tinued to subsist between them. The valuable trade of Nor-
way would still have been theirs, and the navy of Denmark
would have been more usefully combined with that of Britain
than it is at present. These events acquire probability from
the character and habits of the prince by whom Denmark was
governed, and some indications of such a purpose are said to
have been visible at that time. All this, however, is necessa-
rily uncertain, and, in judging of these contingencies, some de-
ference is justly due to the opinions of the British ministry.
In so delicate a crisis, in so arduous a conjuncture, it was in-
cumbent on them to proceed with wariness. As far as the fu-
ture can be reached by human foresight, it must have been
comprehended in their view: though, like all men, liable to
error, no one can pretend to a stronger passion for the interests
of their nation, or a more lively perception of the means condu-
cive to it; and, therefore, it is probable, that their decisions, at
the time they were made, were, on the whole, dictated by the
truest political wisdom; by that wisdom which, turning from
those abstract views which consider all nations as equal, and,
when their interests interfere, deems itself bound to prefer the
greater to the less, embraces the more common feeling which
leads the individual to blend himself with the nation he belongs
to, and to regard, in the first place, the welfare and prosperity
of that nation.

As to the policy of honesty, the utility of justice, these max-
ims have no clear application to human conduct. If utility be
the criterion of justice, each one will conclude it just to benefit
himself. If justice has only a metaphysical or argumentative
test, a door is opened to eternal disputation. With regard to
national transactions, there is a peculiar difficulty, since the
individual appears to be wholly disinterested, and the same feel-
ings which lead him to prefer the interest of his own nation to
that of another occasionally compels him to prefer that inte-
rest to his own personal advantage. He will lay down his life
in order to make a foreign nation the vassal of his own, and
is thus far as personally disinterested as if the sacrifice were
made to preserve his peculiar country from pestilence or civil
war.