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CHAPTER XIII.

BUT though the maritime states were but little affected by
these events, except through the medium of fancy, widely dif-
ferent was the situation of New Orleans. A panic, which,
however groundless it proved, produced very important effects
in that city, and gave birth to events the most disastrous and
oppressive; a fire was kindled in the hearts of the people of
that settlement, which is not likely to be soon quenched; and
some of the worst consequences of civil war, in the interruption
of the usual employments of life, in the imposition of military
duty, and in the exercise of an arbitrary power, in imprisoning
and transporting private persons, without legal process, were
experienced in that city during several months.

The history of transactions at New Orleans is chiefly sup-
plied by letters of the commander in chief to the government,
and by the legal depositions of a few officers and magistrates,
in relation to particular events. Those who incurred suspicion
and persecution, on account of their connection with Burr, have
written copiously in their defence, and the truth, as usual among
hostile and clashing statements, is not easily discovered.
Amidst this labyrinth, it is incumbent on a pen studious of im-
partiality to proceed with caution; but the due caution, on oc-
casions like the present, leads to no certainty, and is obliged to
content itself with leaving the reader to decide on his own con-
clusions of the credibility of witnesses, and the probability of
events.

We are informed by general Wilkinson that he received the
mysterious letter already mentioned, at his camp at Nachito-
ches, by the hands of a stranger, on the sixth of October, 1806.
He does not tell us whether this was or was not the first intima-
tion he obtained of this project. He tells us, however, that the
moment he had decyphered this letter, he put it into the hands
of colonel Cushing, his adjutant and inspector, declaring himself
resolved to oppose the meditated enterprize. Another letter
from Burr was likewise received, merely introducing the bearer,
named Swartwout, to the general. In the intercourse of some
days, the latter extracted from the new comer the following par-
ticulars: that he had been dispatched by Burr to Wilkinson;
that Burr, supported by a powerful association, extending from
New York to New Orleans, was levying seven thousand men,

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in New York and the western territories, for an expedition to
Mexico; that New Orleans, whose inhabitants were favourable
to the cause, would undergo a revolution; that money and all
stores necessary to their voyage to Vera Cruz would be seized;
that the American and British navy would concur in this
scheme, and that the western people were favourable to it.
The names of Bollman, Alexander, and Ogden were mentioned
by Swartwout as confederates in these plans.

This intelligence, somewhat agreeing with the letter, induced
the commander to transmit information concerning it to the
seat of government; but he declares that he doubted the reality
of the project, especially as it related to New Orleans, till he re-
ceived corroborative intelligence from St. Louis.

After the truce with the Spaniards on the Sabine, Wilkinson
proceeded to New Orleans, where he arrived on the twenty-
fifth of November. Several interviews ensued between him
and Bollman, in which the latter informed the other that he had
received letters from Burr, telling him that Burr designed to be
at Natchez on the twentieth of December, with a force of two
thousand men; that four thousand more would follow, and that
twice this number, had it been necessary, might have been
levied with the same facility; and that he expected to obtain
shipping and equipments at New Orleans.

These intelligences were made the immediate occasion of
some military preparation, in repairing the ruinous defences of
the town, but no public assurance or warning was given of the
danger thought to be impending, till the ninth of December,
when the principal citizens were convened, and the dangers im-
pending were laid before them by the general and governor.
They were informed that a numerous army, of seven thousand
men, were then preparing to descend the river, under Burr; that
this force was destined against Mexico, without the knowledge
or permission of the national government; that they proposed
to plunder the banks of New Orleans, seize the shipping, and
supply themselves with every necessary within their reach.

The effect of such tidings, from such high authority, may be
easily imagined; and though the force with which they were
menaced was much too formidable to be resisted, despair
prompted the people to concur eagerly in every measure condu-
cive to the public safety. The merchants instantly agreed that
an embargo should be laid on the shipping, that the crews should
be discharged, and encouraged by bounties, raised by voluntary
contribution, to enter on board the vessels of war, which were
assiduously prepared to aid in resisting the invaders. On the
fourteenth of December, Bollman was arrested, by the general's

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order, and conveyed on board a vessel, to sail for the Atlantic
states. As this arrest was plainly illegal, a writ of habeas cor-
pus was applied for on the prisoner's behalf; but the judge hesi-
tating to grant it in the present circumstance, the delay of a day
ensued before it could be obtained, and in that interval Bollman
had been carried to some distance down the river. Disobe-
dience to the writ was sheltered under the necessity of prompt
measures and military despotism, at such a crisis. Samuel
Swartwout and Peter V. Ogden were likewise arrested at fort
Adams, and brought down to New Orleans, where they were
placed on board a vessel of war. The latter was immediately
liberated by a habeas corpus. The same kind of efforts was im-
mediately made for the release of Swartwout; but he was re-
moved previously to a place under the command of the general,
and Ogden and Alexander were shortly after arrested by the
same authority. Several attempts were made by the judicial
power to release these prisoners, but in vain; the regular troops
and the best part of the militia being in the hands of the general,
and the governor chusing to acquiesce in his measures.

The breach between the military power and the judicial daily
became wider. James Workman, judge of the country of Or-
leans, granted repeatedly writs of habeas corpus, on behalf of
Swartwout and Ogden, and these being slighted, at length
granted an attachment against the general. All these pro-
ceedings being equally fruitless, the judge made a formal de-
mand on the governor, for aid in support of the civil power.
This demand, though repeated, was encountered with silence,
and the judge made a final effort, by laying an account of these
proceedings before the territorial legislature. These transac-
tions were followed by the arrest of the judge himself, of Mr.
John Adair, of Mr. Bradford, and of Mr. Kerr. Workman
and Kerr were, however, speedily released by habeas corpus,
and these were the last arrests that were made. Tidings of
the arrest of the author himself of all these fears and commo-
tions, in the Missisippi territory, being received at New
Orleans, the militia deposited their arms, commerce and mutual
confidence resumed their usual course, and the general tran-
quillity was re-established.

The extensive injury redounding to New Orleans from the
conduct of the general is obvious. The embargo, by suspend-
ing trade, essentially impaired the interests of the mercantile
class, and diffused its mischievous effects to every part of
America or Europe to which the commerce of that city ex-
tended. All classes, in a town purely commercial, are deeply
affected by interruptions to trade. The people for a long time

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laboured under the severest terror of violence and plunder from
an approaching enemy. Great numbers were exposed to the
painful apprehension of personal arrest, and, at least, of tempo-
rary banishment. Of those actually arrested and transported,
all were finally discharged without trial, and even without bail,
when a legal scrutiny was made into their offences; but in the
mean while they suffered many inconveniences and hardships,
to which their final acquittal proved that they had been unjusti-
fiably exposed. Bollman first arrived near Charleston, where an
attempt, ineffectual as the rest, was made to restore him to
liberty, by habeas corpus. From thence he was conveyed to
Annapolis, and finally to Washington. Swartwout, whose hard-
ships were still greater than Bollman's, arrived at Annapolis the
same day, and the two being finally brought before the circuit
court of Columbia on a charge of treason, were committed, but
afterwards dismissed on a habeas corpus, by the supreme court
of the United States. Alexander, Ogden, and Adair, being ex-
posed in like manner to severe hardships, were restored finally
to liberty, by a similar process, at Baltimore.

Though, since the expedition of Burr never took place, and
was probably too rashly concerted ever to have succeeded so far
as to reach New Orleans, had no political impediments been
thrown in the way, it is not necessary to infer, that all the pre-
cautions made use of by the general, painful and oppressive as
they were, were not justified by prudence; the evidence of
letters and rumours, though false, might yet be so specious as to
justify the faithful magistrate or officer in adopting the mea-
sures now related. Even sincerity itself forms a species of
apology, and Wilkinson may plead his own conviction of danger,
even should it appear that such conviction was a mark of imbe-
cility, temerity, or folly.

By those who question the sincerity of the general, without
impeaching his prudence, or who, allowing him the merit of sin-
cerity, question the wisdom of his conduct on this occasion, it is
said, that, on his return from the Sabine, he had required five
hundred militia from the government of the Missisippi terri-
tory to proceed to New Orleans. As the dispute with Spain
was at an end for the present, this measure could only be sug-
gested by the desire of defending the city against Burr; but, if
any attack were feared from the upper country, it is said, that,
instead of weakening Natchez by drawing off its domestic de-
fenders, he should rather have reinforced the militia by a large
detachment from his own troops. He brought down his whole
army to New Orleans, where the river is wide, with a low and
flat country on both sides, and the city incapable of being ade-


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quately fortified but in a long course of time, instead of occupy-
ing some of the many heights, narrows, and islands above Nat-
chez, where the passage is easily defended against a superior
force. The invaders, after mastering the Missisippi territory,
the fort and settlement at Baton Rouge, and both banks of the
river below, and employing the resources of these districts, would
descend with irresistible advantages. The utmost force, regu-
lar and militia, that could be assembled at New Orleans, to op-
pose them, would not be equal to one-eighth of the number con-
fidently reported by the general to be on its voyage towards
him.

When the general first announced the impending invasion,
the season of intercourse and intelligence with the upper coun-
try had commenced; persons from thence were daily arriving,
but brought no tidings of the approach of a fleet and army,
though such a formidable band could not fail to be preceded by
rumours far beyond the truth. The sole authority alleged by
the general himself, for believing the approach of this army, was
the decyphered letter, which conveyed nothing but the chime-
rical intentions or expectations of a person, then at Philadelphia,
and of verbal assurances of two of Burr's friends, who had not
seen him since the date of this letter*. All the direct intelli-
gence from the upper country discredited, not merely the re-
ality, but even the possibility of any hostile expedition of this
kind being actually on foot.

After the first alarm had somewhat subsided at New Orleans,
these views of the general's conduct began to prevail among
those who were aggrieved by the system of military precaution
so rigorously adopted. We are unable fully to refute those ob-
jections to the general's conduct, though it is apparent that the
decyphered letter produced the same apprehensions, and sug-
gested similar precautions, to the national government. The
western states were directed by the president to muster the mi-
litia and arrest suspicious persons and property, on the same
evidence and principles on which Wilkinson had acted. With
respect to the five transported persons, two of them, if the oath
of Wilkinson deserve credit, were certainly apprized of a design
to invade Mexico, and were willing to further and promote it.
One court, before which they were brought, thought them wor-
thy of commitment for trial, and the government thought pro-
per to detain them as prisoners for some time, on the grounds
which the general alleged for their transportation.

  * Swartwout's introductory letter was dated at Philadelphia, July 25, 1806.

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Swartwout, on the testimony of the general, is made to say,
that the combination under Burr extended from New York to
New Orleans. Of the truth of this no legal evidence has hither-
to appeared. The general and governor were liberal of sus-
picion and accusation, but the true grounds of these are un-
known. Many of the recent settlers in New Orleans, emi-
grants from the American states, were exposed to charges of
disaffection and treason, and the general ferment and disquietude
were thus inflamed. Burr's captivity, by crushing all his schemes
in their bud, has of course thrown an oblivious mantle over the
real characters and views of such persons. Since they have not
been proved guilty, we are bound, by reason as well as law, to
deem them innocent*.

  * An eloquent narrative of these transactions, published at New Orleans by
an adversary of Wilkinson, contains a curious account of the views and wishes
of the American emigrants with respect to Mexican expeditions. Speaking of
the inroads of the Spaniards in 1805, and their effect on popular feelings, he
says: “Among the Americans, a spirit of enterprize and resentment universally
prevailed; private associations were formed, with objects beyond a mere defensive
war; and signal retaliations on the Spanish possessions in that vicinity were
every where spoken of with confidence and enthusiasm.” Burr is merely charg-
ed with being the leader of such an association, and surely this confession re-
flects some little probability on this charge. A curious account is afterwards
given of an actual association of this kind, and of a trial at law, in which the
general had endeavoured to confound this fraternity with the Mexican part of
Burr's conspiracy. This writer says, the expedition planned by this association
“had assumed a character eminently elevated above all schemes of petty war-
fare and pillage. The object was not to steal upon and plunder the unarmed
merchant. It was to raise the standard of natural rights, political liberty, and
free trade, in the face of opposing armies; and deliver one of the fairest por-
tions of the globe from a most odious system of colonial bondage, conceived in
tyranny, and nursed in fear, ignorance, and weakness. The project may have
been visionary, or be considered as impracticable. But it does credit at least to
the hearts that warmed in the cause; and only required, like the American re-
volution, the sanction of success, to reflect immortal honour on all engaged in it.”
This miserable cant must have been the favourite rhetoric of Miranda and
Burr, and it is evident that such views must have been admirably calculated to
give success to the intrigues of Burr at New Orleans. Burr's letter professes no
intention of plundering banks and seizing ships, and his agents merely talk of
the probable necessity of borrowing some of the specie and vessels. In another
place he says, “the president's proclamation against Burr had reached New
Orleans about the 6th of January, but produced no extraordinary sensation
there. So far as Burr's designs were conceived against Mexico, they excited no
manner of uneasiness. It indeed surprised the good people of Louisiana not a
little to find the government so extremely solicitous about the territories of their
neighbours, after having shown so much indifference as to the protection of their
own.” These passages, in a publication expressly designed to expose Wilkin-
son's conduct to contempt and abhorrence, on the principle that the danger
from Burr was imaginary, are very extraordinary. This pamphlet, indeed,
though written with opposite intentions, reflects strong probability on the opinion
that Burr had formed the plan of a Mexican expedition at least, and that New

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Orleans supplied him with many partizans. Burr's designs might naturally enough,
in this state of things, excite no uneasiness among the American settlers at New
Orleans, but the guardians of the nation were bound to be very uneasy on this
account, because the most flagrant mischiefs could not fail to follow a war en-
tered into thus unjustly and wantonly with France and Spain. And for what
end? To gratify the lust of plunder and adventure, in a few unsettled individuals,
who have the insolent folly of clothing their lawless views, under the stale,
bald, flagitious pretences of giving liberty and independence to those whom they
murder or despoil.